The Constitution of the Taiwan (ROC)

When the Constitution of the ROC was first drafted, it emphasized the independence of the five powers.  The legislative power has become dominant now, overriding the executive, judicial, supervisory, and examination powers. Isn't this strange?

Article 57 of the Constitution regulates the methods of questioning, reconsideration, and confirmation. Why do I feel that the current chaos is due to the abuse of Article 57? Maybe my understanding of the legal provisions and text is not accurate enough.

中華民國的憲法一開始在制定時，就強調五權分立，但是現在卻變成立法權獨大，凌駕行政、司法、監察及考試權之上，這樣不會很奇怪嗎？

憲法第57條的規範，規範了質詢、覆議、覆議之決議方式，為什麼我怎麼看都覺得現在的亂象是因為濫用第57條啊。有可能是我對法律條文及文字的理解不夠精確吧。

---------------- https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000001 ----

憲法第57條：

行政院依左列規定，對立法院負責：
一、行政院有向立法院提出施政方針及施政報告之責。立法委員在開會時，有向行政院院長及行政院各部會首長質詢之權。
二、立法院對於行政院之重要政策不贊同時，得以決議移請行政院變更之。行政院對於立法院之決議，得經總統之核可，移請立法院覆議。覆議時，如經出席立法委員三分之二維持原決議，行政院院長應即接受該決議或辭職。
三、行政院對於立法院決議之法律案、預算案、條約案，如認為有窒礙難行時，得經總統之核可，於該決議案送達行政院十日內，移請立法院覆議。覆議時，如經出席立法委員三分之二維持原案，行政院院長應即接受該決議或辭職。

Article 57
The Executive Yuan shall be responsible to the Legislative Yuan in accordance with the following provisions:
1. The Executive Yuan has the duty to present to the Legislative Yuan a statement of its administrative policies and a report on its administration. While the Legislative Yuan is in session, Members of the Legislative Yuan shall have the right to question the President and the Ministers and Chairmen of Commissions of the Executive Yuan.
2. If the Legislative Yuan does not concur in any important policy of the Executive Yuan, it may, by resolution, request the Executive Yuan to alter such a policy. With respect to such resolution, the Executive Yuan may, with the approval of the President of the Republic, put a request to the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration. If, after reconsideration, two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan present at the meeting uphold the original resolution, the President of the Executive Yuan shall either abide by the same or resign from office.
3. If the Executive Yuan deems a resolution on a statutory, budgetary, or treaty bill passed by the Legislative Yuan difficult of execution, it may, with the approval of the President of the Republic and within ten days after its transmission to the Executive Yuan, request the Legislative Yuan to reconsider the said resolution. If after reconsideration, two-thirds of the Members of the Legislative Yuan present at the meeting uphold the original resolution, the President of the Executive Yuan shall either abide by the same or resign from office.